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Abstract
This paper offers a model of growth with heterogeneous agents in
which, due to asymmetric information, financial markets do not work
properly. In such a world, the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails to
hold, a financial hierarchy emerges and ‘how to finance’ the engine
of growth – in our case represented by uncertain endeavours in R&D
- matters. In turn, heterogeneity means that agents lack sufficient
information on the behaviour adopted by the others, forcing them to
make use of naive rules in forming expectations and in calculating
their probability of bankruptcy. The basic properties of the model are
explored via simulations. In particular, it is possible to appreciate
how a worsening of financial conditions (e.g. an increase of the
contractual interest rate on loans or of the probability of bankruptcy)
affects negatively the long-run average rate of growth.
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41. Introduction
Growth theorists have always made a large use of ‘stilized facts’ to guide
the direction of their research agenda. In fact, since Kaldor’s fist attempt to
list them, the number of what scholars think are relevant stylized facts of
economic growth has sensibly increased. This enlargement of the set of
relevant regularities has mirrored successful efforts in the “… creative art of
construction of new models” (Romer, 1994, p.11). In particular, new ideas
on how to model long-run growth have emerged by the consciousness –
confirmed by an increasing amount of up-to-date statistical evidence - that
one of the main implication of the Solow’s theory, namely cross-country
convergence, lacks of any empirical support. Indeed, the theoretical view
received at the beginning of the ‘80s was not able to reconcile the fact of a
large number of poor countries trapped in underdevelopment equilibria with
low per-capita income, investment and technical progress, with the fact that
capital does not flow (much) from rich to poor countries.
Endogenous growth theory has changed our way of thinking about
growth by providing a picture made of multiple self-fulfilling expectations,
multiple equilibria and development thresholds. We claim that whether this
task has been accomplished is a result of ‘positive spillovers’ with a
contemporaneous ongoing paradigmatic shift in macroeconomics reasoning:
the New-Keynesian stream of thought1, with its emphasis on coordination
failure due to strategic complementarities and positive spillovers (Cooper
and John, 1988), and on the failure of the First Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics in the presence of imperfect competition (Blanchard
and Kiyotaki, 1987). Admittedly, much less attention has been paid by
growth theorists to the other main message launched out by New-Keynesian
Economics (NKE), that is an urge to find an explicit role for asymmetric
information as a cause of imperfections on financial markets2.
Admittedly, informational imperfections in financial markets have long
be recognized as one of the most important reasons why levels of income
and rates of growth between the developed and less developed economies
                                                          
1
 Dixon and Rankin (1995) prefer to talk of New Macroeconomics, as a “… shift towards a
macroeconomics based on microfoundations with market imperfections of one kind or
another” (p.1).
2
 For a critical assessment of this two distinct lines of research of New-Keynesian
Economics see Ardeni et al. (1993).
5do not converge3. Nevertheless, models with endogenous growth in general
do retain the implicit assumption of perfect capital markets. In other words,
the accumulation of reproducible factors – either physical or human capital -
can be always financed, the only constraint being given by a no-Ponzi-game
transversality condition. Given suitable contour conditions for the
optimization problem, the system is thus solved for its steady-state rate of
growth. In a world with imperfectly competitive markets for goods and
labour but perfect information, this is not a problem. However, once we
allow for the presence of asymmetric information, firm’s ability to get
money from potential shareholders or bank loans is severely hampered by
the adverse selection and the adverse incentive effects: equity and credit
rationing can occur as equilibrium phenomena. In this case, investment and
production decisions are strictly constrained by the availability of funds4.
In this paper we investigate the functioning of an imperfectly competitive
model of growth, where internal funds are not sufficient to finance both
production and R&D investments, and external finance is costly due to
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. The financing issue
displays major effects on the long-run behaviour of our model economy. In
particular, simulations confirm that a worsening of financial conditions (due
e.g. to an increase of the contractual interest rate on loans or to an increase
of the probability of bankruptcy) decreases the long-run average rate of real
growth. In this sense, our model could be inscribed in the small but growing
literature which aims to explore the nexus between financial markets and
growth, which we briefly survey in section 2.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we
discuss some general features of an imperfectly competitive growth model
where financial issues matter. Such a model is then formalized in section 4.
In section 5, we analyze some simulated examples in order to assess the
impact of financial variables - notably, the interest rate on loans and the
bankruptcy cost – on the dynamic behaviour of our model economy. Section
6 concludes.
                                                          
3
 See e.g. Stiglitz (1989).
4
 A survey of the economics of imperfect capital markets from a New-Keynesian
perspective is provided by Delli Gatti and Tamborini (1998).
62. Related literature
Development economists have long recognised the tight relationship
between growth and financial markets conditions, as an explanation for the
disappointing performance of less-developed countries5. Far less attention to
this topic has been devoted by ‘endogenous-growth’ theorists. Some
relevant exceptions exist, however.
In a first generation of endogenous-growth models with an explicit role
for the financial sector, research draw attention on the different functions
financial intermediaries might play in promoting growth. So, in Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1990) and Bencivenga and Smith (1991) the development of
financial intermediation fosters real economic growth acting as a device for
a better resource allocation6. This task is accomplished either by pooling
risks across investors whenever information on expected rate of returns are
not promptly available, or by insuring investors against the risk of
unpredictable liquidity needs.
The additional issue of the role played by agency costs due to
asymmetric information in weakening economic development is taken up in
a second group of papers, e.g. Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and Ma and
Smith (1996). Central to these contributions is the interaction between
informational asymmetries that give rise to credit rationing (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981) and real growth, in an overlapping generation model with
social increasing returns to scale of the Romer’s (1986) type. In these
models, equilibrium – that is, steady-state - growth rate and level of credit
rationing are jointly determined and inversely related: the higher the degree
of rationing on the credit market, the lower the steady-state rate of real
growth.
From a different perspective, Greenwald, Kohn and Stiglitz (1990) and
Stiglitz (1992, 1993) stress the role of retained earnings or net worth in
financing real growth. The approach followed in these papers does not
assign any formal role to the costly state verification problem typical of any
agency relationship. Alternatively, net worth matters because managers of
firms are wary of debt financing, since this increases their probability of
bankruptcy. On its part, this means that managers are risk-averse, risk-
aversion being formalized by making their utility a concave function of
                                                          
5
 See Patrick (1966), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973).
6
 See also the survey by Pagano (1993).
7profits. In particular, the relative simplicity of this framework allows their
proponents to explore the nexus between business cycles and long-run
growth, this latter being driven by learning-by-doing or explicit R&D efforts
in productivity enhancing activities. In both cases, imperfections on the
capital market means that economic downturns can have damaging long-run
consequences. Economic downturns have adverse effects on firms’ cash
flow, and are likely to be accompanied by more extensive credit rationing.
In turn, less expenditures on R&D and lower levels of investments and
production result in less learning. Hence, after a slowdown the growth path
of the economy is permanently shifted down.
In such a framework, fluctuations arise endogenously as a co-ordinated
self-fulfilling shift of individuals’ expectations – very much in line with the
‘animal spirits’ hypothesis - on future economic conditions. In addition,
Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1996) demonstrate that simply inserting a ‘no
shirking constraint’ in the wage formation process may give rise to irregular
– i.e. chaotic – fluctuations around an endogenous trend.
Our model intends to further elaborate in this direction, by studying the
consequences for the ‘risk-aversion’ class of models of treating explicitly
the following issues:
1) An imperfectly competitive goods market.
2) ‘True’ heterogeneity among producers.
3. An informal discussion of the model.
Our basic framework is a dynamic imperfectly competitive economy,
where a given number of heterogeneous firms produce and sell non-
perfectly substitutable commodities. A double level of rationality
characterizes firms7. Fist, they resort to routinized behaviour in dealing with
the forecast of variables characterized by a remarkable degree of complexity
(i.e. forecasts regarding technological change, the behaviour currently
adopted by competitors, and the probability to yield negative profits and
consequently to incur in bankruptcy). Second, they employ updated relevant
variables in the short-run profit maximization program.
In order to survive in an effectively competitive environment, firms are
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 From this point of view, Meyer, Vogt and Voßkamp (1996) take an approach very similar
to the one considered in this paper.
8periodically involved in uncertain search activities with the aim of
improving their competitiveness by means of technological progress. In our
setting, by technological progress we mean technologies whose productivity
is higher than the existing ones. Therefore, we abstract from product
innovations. The level of effort put forth by a firm is measured by the
amount of money spent in technological search processes, which we label
Research and Development (R&D).
The economy is sequential, with discrete periods of time - indexed with t
- lasting 2τ, so that t+1 = t + 2τ. The production cycle of each firm starts at
the beginning of period t, and it takes τ to be completed. In t+τ commodities
are brought to the market and sold out. The time schedule of production and
marketing implies that firms must be able to pay for their desired input
before being able to sell their output. In line with standard New-Keynesian
theorizing (see e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993), we assume that ex ante
informational asymmetries on the stock market prevent firms from issuing
new equities. In turn, they are allowed to finance entirely their production
by recurring to credit, at an additional cost determined by the risk of
bankruptcy (borrower’s risk in Keynes’ terminology). Bankruptcy occurs
whenever profits are less or equal to zero. The total number of firms is on
average maintained fixed by allowing new entries to replace exactly the
number of exits due to bankruptcy with a one time lag.
At the same time, a two stage lottery starts, which depending on the
amount of money invested in it determines: i) whether the R&D effort has
success, and ii) how much productivity increases as a result of successfully
R&D. Recall that in the presence of asymmetric information on the capital
market, external finance is more costly than internal funds. Among the set
of investment opportunities, risk averse firms prefer to finance the more
uncertain endeavour by recurring to the cheaper source, that is to available
cash-flow. In this model, R&D expenditure - whose impact on productivity
retains the higher degree of uncertainty - will be preferably financed by
means of retained profits. Furthermore, as emphasised by Stiglitz (1993),
investments expenditures in R&D differ from other investments because
they are not, in general, collateralizable.
9The chart below provides an illustration of the time structure.
_____________________________________________________________
__
t production
t+τ commodities are marketed   firms gain profits and
                                                                 invest  them in the R&D lottery           
t+2τ   the t+1 productivity
            parameter is discovered
Figure 1 – Production and R&D in the sequence economy
Summarizing, firms are destined to lose or to gain market shares
according to their present ability to make profits, which ultimately depends
on their competitive position in the past. The competitive selection process
provides an incentive to invest in R&D. At the microeconomic level,
entrepreneurs invest basically in order to conserve and expand their
competitiveness. At the aggregate level there is competition-led endogenous
growth, given that successful R&D allows an increase in the average
productivity, thus an expansion in the aggregate productive capacity.
4. Analytical details.
One can think of the economy as being restricted to a particular industry
composed of a population of firms producing a single good in K varieties. In
turn, exclusively one firm produces each variety. A representative consumer
endowed with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) additive utility
function of the Dixit-Stiglitz type expresses the following standard demand
curve for commodity j:
( ) ( )( )Y t
P t
Q t
Y
Kj
d j
d
=




−σ
 ,                      (1)
where Pj (t) represents the price charged by firm j, Y d is the real aggregate
income available for consumption in the whole economy, σ is the constant
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elasticity of substitution between couples of good, with σ > 1; and finally
Q(t) is a CES index for the aggregate price level:
( ) ( )Q t
K
P tj
j
K
=



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−
=
−∑1 1
1
1
1
σ
σ
.                                  (2)
We assume that, besides the difference in the variety of the common
good they produce, firms can differ because of the technology they employ,
which translates into heterogeneity of relative market shares. Let us assume
that firm j production function is yj (t) = zj (t) nj a → nj  = 
a
a
z
y
1
1
 → nj = 
e
yα
,
where n is labour demand, and zj represents a productivity parameter. Thus,
total costs are equal to:
( ) ( )( )te
tY
WtC
j
j
j
α
=  ,                                              (3)
with α > 1. Being labour the only production factor, total costs are de
facto a wage bill, where W is the nominal wage rate. Expression (3) states
that for a given peculiar technology parameter ej (t) =ej, each firm
experiences increasing static real marginal costs. Nevertheless, costs can be
dynamically decreasing as soon as the variable ej (t) follows a sufficiently
fast increasing path. This is indeed the mechanics of real growth in our
model8, to which we now move our attention.
4.1 Effective competition as the engine of growth.
In order to understand the long-run dynamics of the model, it is worthy to
have a look at a sort of ‘deterministic’ version of the model. As a first-order
approximation, let us suppose that the population of heterogeneous firms
dwelling in the economy can not pursue any innovative activity. The
absence of technological change implies that at least one Nash-type
                                                          
8
 In a companion paper (Gaffeo, 1999), the author uses a similar framework to explore the
implications of alternative assumptions on the degree of localization of technological
change for the long-run average rate of growth.
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equilibrium can be easily found. Recall, from equation (1), that the demand
function for a generic firm j is given by:
( ) ( )( ) ( )Y t
P t
Q t D t Kj
d j
=




−σ
,  ,                                 (1’)
where we have substituted for the term 
( )Y t
K
 the expression D(t,K). Notice
that the latter is equal to the market share of firm j along a symmetric long-
run equilibrium, where Pj = Q ⇒ Q
Pj
= 1; in our model, this constitutes a
useful benchmark of comparison for the market share a firm can obtain
along an heterogeneous equilibrium. For any given level of nominal
aggregate demand, D(t,K) is clearly a function of the number of firms
operating at time t.
The relative competitive position of firm j when adopting its peculiar
technology (1/ej) is then given by the ratio of firm j’s market share and
potential market share in the homogeneous case:
( )
( )
( )
( )
Y t
D t K
P t
Q t
j
d
j
,
=




−σ
.                       (4)
Let us define this competitive ratio as 
( )
( )
Y t
D t K
j
d
,
 = Xj (t,K); hence, X (t,K) is
the vector of relative competitive shares for each firm j = 1, ..., K+1. This
represents a complete configuration at each time t of an imperfectly
competitive market composed of K firms.
Taking logs, one obtains:
xj (t,K) = - σ (pj (t) - q (t)) ,   j = 1,2,...,K+1,                     (5)
where lower case letters represent the logarithms of the relative variables.
Obviously, a positive xj means that firm j has a market share higher than the
one characterizing the symmetric equilibrium; the opposite holds for a
negative xj. The system of equations (5) identifies the equilibrium
competitive ratio for every firm j = 1,2,...,K+1, in a form which closely
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resembles the notion of ‘fitness’ as largely employed by evolutionary
economics9. In this literature, fitness is a useful biological metaphor for the
ability of a firm to survive in a competitive environment. In our framework,
the lower the price a firm is allowed to fix, the higher its overall fitness, i.e.
its relative competitive position.
Armed with these insights, we can now provide a preliminary analysis of
what happens in the long-run for three alternative situations: 1) the case in
which firms are homogeneous; 2) the case in which firms are
heterogeneous, but technology can not change; 3) the case in which the
degree of heterogeneity can change as time goes by, because of
productivity-enhancing R&D investments.
4.1.1 The homogeneous case.
Under the assumption of homogeneity, it immediately follows that the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium solution is defined as x j
j
K
=
=
∑ 0
1
. Hence, in this
case the equilibrium can be derived as xh = {0,0,...,0}T, where the apex h
defines the homogeneous case.
4.1.2 The heterogeneous static case.
Suppose now the population of firms is heterogeneous, and that they
might be ranked from the more to the less efficient, e1 > e2 > ... > eK. When
firms employ heterogeneous technologies, at any time t the market is
described by the vector xn = {x1, x2, ...,xK}T (the apex n identifying the
heterogeneous case), and there exists a technology ej* such that xj < 0 holds
if ej < ej*, and xj > 0 if ej > ej*. This threshold value may be found noting
that if one substitutes from the BRF, it follows that:
xj (K) = - σ ω 0 (ω 1 - ln ej ) ,                      (6)
                                                          
9In evolutionary economics, a relative fitness function is defined as the differential equation
( )d s
d t v E E s
i
i i= −
, where s is the relative market share of firm i, Ei its somehow
determined competitiveness, and 〈E〉 the average competitiveness of all firms in the
industry ( = Σ si Ei). For relevant applications of replicator dynamics, see e.g. Iwai (1984)
and Silverberg (1988); for interesting discussions on the relation between evolutionary
equilibria and equilibrium concepts in economics, see e.g. Friedman (1991) and Joosten
(1996).
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where ω 0 = 1/δ, and ω 1 = ln A + (α -1) ln D. Thus, heterogeneity for itself
does not sensibly affect the market structure of the long-run equilibrium,
given that the degree of polymorphism which initially characterizes the
market propagates to its long-run solution.
4.1.3. The heterogeneous dynamic case.
More interesting results emerge if we abandon the static representation in
order to consider the effect of technological change. Suppose that each firm
is engaged in learning-by-doing or on-the-job-training activities, which
allow the firm to improve its productivity at a given rate. Now relative
prices potentially change at each time. Therefore, we can obtain a replicator
function by simply taking the derivative with respect to time of equation (5):
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )x t
p t
p t
q t
q t
x tj
j
j
j
•
•
•
= − −







σ  ,             j = 1,2,...,K ,                      (7)
i.e., the rate of change of the competitiveness of firm j as measured by the
relative market share increases (decreases) as far as its price grows less
(more) than the average price.
Let us suppose that the increase in productivity - and the consequently
decrease in price - allowed by investments in R&D is a deterministic
function of retained profits, pj(t) = h(pij(t)), with h’ < 0. In turn, profits are
higher the higher is the relative market share of firm j, pij(t) = f(xj(t)), f’ > 0.
It follows that pj(t) = h f(xj (t)), where the symbol   indicates the inner
product. Recall that at any time t fitness is measured by {-σ [pj (t) - q (t)]}.
It is straightforward to note that the fitness function and the dynamic
process representing the evolution of the population composition are sign-
compatible, that is they have the same sign whenever xj > 0. Under this
condition, we can follow the arguments reported in Joosten (1996) to
demonstrate that the deterministic system of K+1 equations composed by
the K equations in (7) and the relationship for the aggregate price index
admits at least one fixed point10. Furthermore, every stable fixed point is a
saturated equilibrium, that is an equilibrium at which each survived firm has
                                                          
10
 As usual, we state the existence of a fixed point for the dynamic system under
consideration if there exists at least one trajectory that did not start in it, but which
converges to it.
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highest fitness. As the dynamic process goes on, firms whose market share
prevents them from gaining profits go bankrupt, and the number of
operating firms shrinks. Eventually, only the fittest firms will survive.
If we allow investments in R&D to be a stochastic outcome, the
dynamics of the system remains seriously affected, in a way which depends
primarily on the characteristics of the probability distribution of the random
process. As a result, the long-run properties of the system can be in general
detected only by making use of simulations. Nevertheless, it is important to
stress that even in the stochastic case the incentive to invest in R&D remains
as the only way to survive.
To summarize, firms have an incentive to invest in R&D as much as they
can, because this is the only means they have to survive. As we said, the
expression ‘as much as they can’ assumes here a special meaning: due to
asymmetric information on the financial markets, firms investing in R&D
are forced to recur exclusively to retained profits, given that external finance
is not available.
4.2 Production decisions.
At the beginning of time t, ∀ t ∈ T, K firms play a one-shot game
adopting Bertrand-type strategies. The owner of the firm producing variety j
determines her optimal price, and via the demand function her optimal
output as well, given consumers’ preferences and the aggregate price index.
Recall that the aggregate price index measures the average behaviour of his
competitors. Commodities are then sold in t + τ.
Since production costs must be incurred before cashing in sales proceeds,
firms must pay wages to workers in advance. In other words, they must raise
funds to anticipate the wage bill. Due to asymmetric information, the issue
of new equities is ruled out: equity rationing occurs at any instant.
Furthermore, profits inherited from the past (i.e. from period t - 1) are used
up to finance R&D investments. Therefore, firms can finance the wage bill
in period t exclusively by borrowing from banks. For simplicity, we assume
that firms, in financing production, have unlimited access to debt; the
banking system accommodates the demand for loans at the given
contractual rate of interest. Debt is repaid completely in each period, so that
there is no debt accumulation. If at t + τ  real profits becomes negative,
firms incur in bankruptcy. Associated to bankruptcy there is a cost to
managers, that is assumed to be an increasing function of output.
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Thus, the problem consists in maximizing profits for period t with respect
to the relative price 
( )
( )
P t
Q t
j
:
max ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) je
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e
j
je
j
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
=−
  (8)
where BCj (t), i.e. bankruptcy costs, is assumed to be an increasing linear
function of the proceeds of sales, depending on the probability of
bankruptcy φj; d is the marginal bankruptcy cost;  r is the contractual
interest rate on loans. The real wage is assumed to be equal in every period
to 1: in other words, we assume that a real wage equal to 1 clears the labour
market  at each t.
From an inspection of the maximization problem (8), one can easily
realize that our framework departs from the ones usually analyzed in the
literature for two relevant issues.
First, notice that firm j neither knows the actual prices of competitors,
nor the aggregate price index, which will become revealed information only
in t + τ. This is an obvious application of the informational problem arising
in non-competitive decentralized economies: firms set their prices
simultaneously given their private information, but price decisions interact
since firms compete over market shares. While in the standard literature on
monopolistic competition this problem is solved by assuming a
homogeneous Nash equilibrium (each entrepreneur knows the price chosen
by the others, since it is equal to the one she chooses), in heterogeneous
markets competitors’ prices have to be somehow forecasted. Given that
firms change continuously their technologies, and that each firm has a
positive but strictly less than one probability to find an innovation, the
environment is a stochastic, non-stationary one. A sketch of the proof is
provided in the appendix. From non-stationarity it follows that the notion of
rational expectations can not be applied11. As an alternative, simulations
reported in the following section rely on the simplest among the naive
forecast rules, assuming firms forecast their competitors’ prices taking static
expectations, Q e (t) = Q (t-1).
A second interesting by-product of non-stationarity is that firms neither
                                                          
11
 Indeed, non-stationarity even prevents the applicability of recursive least squares learning
schemes.
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can calculate their probability of bankruptcy from a stationary (i.e. ergodic)
distribution12, nor they can make Bayesian inference in updating it. Again,
firms have to adopt some naive rule. A natural candidate is that firms assign
to their probability of default an hazard function decreasing with time. In
other words, as time goes by, conditioned to the simple fact that the firm
survives the probability to incur in bankruptcy decreases. The figure 2
illustrates this case.
                   1
                 φ
                   φ
                   0                                                                                t
Figure 2 – Individual ‘perceived’ probability of bankruptcy.
At time 0, a firm enters the market. The hazard function associated to its
probability of bankruptcy is strictly less that one, and decreases as time goes
by with a reverse logistic shape. After some time, the probability of
bankruptcy reach asymptotically its inferior limit, which can be very close
but strictly higher than zero. As we will discuss informally below, this
hazard function could produce qualitatively interesting dynamics along the
business cycle.
By now, it is necessary to stress that this assumption introduces an
additional source of heterogeneity, as can be appreciated by noting that
firms with different ages have also different probabilities to go bankrupt.
Furthermore, due to the ‘entry-and-exit’ process the distribution of hazard
rates over the population of firms changes potentially at any point in time.
To keep track of the evolving hazard rate distribution within the economy is
                                                          
12
 For analytical convenience, the underlined price distribution almost universally
considered in the literature when calculating the probability of default is the uniform
distribution.
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in general quite difficult. In particular, from a computationally point of view
this amounts to add to the problem a set of additional state variables, each
one capturing one of the relevant features (i.e. moments) of the firms’
distribution.
Since in this paper we are primarily concern with the long-run
consequences of financial market imperfections, at this stage of the analysis
we prefer to focus on a restricted version of the hazard function approach.
Thus, in what follows we assume a common fixed probability - that is, all
firms perceive their probability to incur in bankruptcy equals to the
‘asymptotic’ value of the hazard function - and we allow it to shift
exogenously.
From the first order condition we obtain a standard Best Replay Function
(BRF):
( )
( )
( )
( )
δα
φ
1
1
,
1
1

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

−
+
=
−
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d
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tP
jj
e
j
,                                          (9)
where B = 
σα
σ − 1
, and δ = 1+σ(α - 1).
As usual, each firm fixes its profit-maximizing price by choosing a point
along its BRF. Optimal price is an increasing function both of the
contractual interest rate on loans r, and of the marginal cost of bankruptcy
dφj: a higher probability of bankruptcy worsens the competitive position.
As a natural counterpart, we observe that the output associated with
optimal price is given by:
( ) ( ) ( )
ξ
ε
φ KtDd
r
te
B
ty
jj
j ,1
1
−




−
+
=       (10)
where 
δ
σ
ε =  and ( )11 −+= α
δ
σξ . In line with standard results of the
asymmetric information-based NKE (see e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993),
individual output is a decreasing function of r and of dφj. In other words, a
worsening of financial conditions has a negative effect on output.
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4.3 The R&D lottery.
R&D investments, which generates innovative technologies, are modelled
as uncertain activities, whose outcomes are governed by a two-stage
stochastic process. At any time, each firm spend their retained profits to buy
as many tickets of the lottery as possible. One can think of these tickets as
wages to be paid to scientists – whose duty is that of discovering new
productivity enhancement technologies13 – employed in the firm’s R&D
department. Discovery and implementation of new technologies are
uncertain activities themselves, in a sense that will become clearer below.
Let us now describe the two stages of the lottery in turn.
Stage 1. At time t+τ each firm sets up an R&D department by hiring a
certain number of scientists. How many scientists a firm can hire depends
on the amount of financial resource the firm can count on. The scientists’
duty is that of transforming the money invested on them by the firm – that
is, retained profits - in a productivity enhancing discovery.
Let Ij (t+τ) be a Boolean random variable indicating firm j’s success in
innovative R&D. It takes value 1 if a new technology has been found, 0
otherwise. The probability of Ij (t+τ) to be 1 is given by:
µj (t+τ) = Pr {Ij (t+τ) = 1} = ( )( )( )θτpiκ +− tjexp1
where κ and θ are parameters, with κ > 1 and 0 < θ < 1. This latter condition
means that search for new technologies is characterized by decreasing
returns.
Stage 2. If Ij (t+τ) = 1, j’s productivity is given by:
( )( ) ( )( )λτ +−=+ 11teteE jj  
i.e. the firm experiences an increase of productivity on average equal to a
percentage λ, which is the mean value of a Poisson distributed stochastic
process, with a variance equal to υ 2.
                                                          
13
 Given the absence of physical capital, in our framework the expression ‘new technology’
should be better interpreted as a new form of organizing production.
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5. Simulations.
The analytical setting presented above provides all the ingredients for an
idealized characterization of the dynamic behaviour of an effectively and
continuously changing economy with asymmetric information. In our world,
individuals are endowed with a bounded ability to forecast the future, and
interact strategically. Unfortunately, the complex structure of the composite
stochastic process driving the system dynamics does not allow a ‘closed
form’ analytical solution. Henceforth, the basic long-run properties of our
economy should be inferred by resorting to simulations.
At time 0, firms are assumed to adopt the same technology and to face an
identical market share, equal to 15 units of output. Initial individual (and
aggregate, given the assumption of initial symmetry) price is fixed at 10. At
the beginning of period 1 a vector of idiosyncratic ‘mean preserving spread’
technological shocks displaces firms from the homogeneous equilibrium.
The stochastic model of section 3 is then employed to simulate the dynamic
behaviour of the whole economy. At any stage of the market game,
aggregate disposable income is given by real wages plus real profits from
the previous period. The average increase in productivity λ associated to
successful R&D equals to an expected jump of 3.5% from the present
technology, and it is common to all firms. Finally, as a working assumption
we allow firms exited in time t to be replaced by an equal number of firms
with the ‘average’ technology in t-1.
Table 1 reports the starting value of relevant variables and parameters.
Initial level of technology ej (0) 4.53
Elasticity of substitution σ 3
‘Static’ returns α 1.2
Fixed cost F 5
Increase in productivity λ 0.035
Number of firms K 50
Table 1 – Values of relevant parameters and initial value of
                 individual technology.
Simulations are performed with the goal of comparing two alternative
situations with reference to 1) the ‘depth’ of financial markets, particularly
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the market for loans; and 2) the ‘turbulence’ on the goods markets, here
measured by alternative assumptions on the probability to incur in
bankruptcy. There is a large body of evidence14 that lends support to the fact
that Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) are characterized by a limited
development of their financial industry, which translates into far from
perfectly competitive conditions on the market for loans. Furthermore, it
seems plausible to associate to underdeveloped economies a higher degree
of ‘borrower’s risk’, that is of the risk of bankruptcy as it is perceived by
managers. Our model permits precisely to analyze the mechanism through
which these two effects are detrimental to real growth.
In figure 3 we plot the logarithm of the average growth path for two
alternative parameterizations of the model15. Averages have been obtained
by taking the arithmetic mean from 100 simulations for each parameterized
treatment. The dashed line represents the case of ‘cheap finance’, in which
the interest rate on loans is equal to 2.25%, the marginal cost of bankruptcy
is at 0.2, and the individual probability of bankruptcy is almost null (φ  =
0.001). The solid line illustrates the case of ‘expensive finance’, where r is
5%, the probability of bankruptcy is at 2%, and the marginal cost of
bankruptcy is 0.4. This latter case, if compared to the former one, is meant
to capture the typical financial conditions of a LDC. In particular, the idea
behind a higher real interest rate is that banking industry in LDCs is likely
to be characterized by less competitive conditions in comparison to those in
developed countries.
                                                          
14
 See King and Levine (1993).
15
 Simulations have been run for a time span of 110 periods. The first 10 periods are not
represented in order to get rid of transients.
21
Figure 3 – Average growth paths for two alternative parameterizations:
           1) dashed line: r = 0.025; φ  = 0.001; d = 0.2
           2) solid line: r = 0.05; φ  = 0.02; d = 0.4.
Figure 3 highlights that a worsening of financial conditions decreases the
average rate of growth. The reason for this result can be easily understood
by resorting to equation (10). Ceteris paribus, individual equilibrium output
is negatively affected by an increase of the cost to finance production.
According to our model, economies starting from an identical position but
for their financial conditions will experience diverging growth paths.
Unfortunately, by averaging simulated paths we are not allowed to
appreciate the interaction between business cycles and growth. To
investigate this issue, consider figure 4 where we plot the logarithm of two
selected simulated growth paths for the two alternative parameterizations.
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Figure 4 – Selected simulated growth paths for the two
                   alternative parameterizations:
           1) dashed line: ‘cheap finance’
           2) solid line: ‘expensive finance’.
The solid line, which represents the case of ‘expensive finance’, is
characterized by a marked tendency for its trend to be permanently lowered
after any downturn. In other words, whenever conditions on the financial
markets worsen, economic downturns have long-run effects. Once again, the
intuition for this result is straightforward: slight changes in revenues can
have large effects on firms’ cash flow. In the presence of significant capital
market imperfections, this leads to less expenditures in R&D which means a
lower rate of productivity growth. As a result, the growth path of the
economy is permanently lowered. In fact, according to our story it is
precisely this effect that determines the divergence of the average growth
paths between countries with developed financial markets and countries in
which financial markets are underdeveloped.
As a last point, we spend some words on a question left open in our
previous discussion, that is: how would our results be affected by a
complete application of the hazard function hypothesis? Even in the absence
of any analytical or simulated counterpart, some reasonable conjectures may
be advanced. Other things equal, whenever a firm goes bankrupt the
newcomer which replaces it operates with a relatively higher probability of
default and consequently, due to equation (10), with a lower production
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level. In other words, the decreasing hazard function hypothesis represents a
means of persistence for downturns. Recall that the probability that a
sufficient number of defaults trigger a downturn is higher for an economy
with tight financial conditions. Since the ‘severity’ of a recession – here
represented by the number of periods in which the output is below its trend -
permanently influences the long-run rate of growth, the longer it takes for
the individual hazard functions to reach their lower asymptotic value, the
more the long-run aggregate path is affected by any downturn.
6. Conclusions.
In this paper we have provided a model of growth with heterogeneous
firms in which, due to asymmetric information in the financial markets, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold. While in general neo-classical
models of growth assume perfect capital markets, in our framework the way
growth is financed matters. In particular, simulations allow us to appreciate
the negative impact on the long-run rate of growth of an increase of the
contractual interest rate on loans and of the probability of bankruptcy as
perceived by risk-averse managers.
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Appendix
In this appendix we provide a sketch of the proof for the statement that the aggregate
price process is a non-stationary stochastic process. The proof proceeds in several steps.
First, remember that the aggregate price index is of the CES type:
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and that from equation (9) it follows that, for any given Q(t), firm’s j price is a stochastic
process Pj(t) = Γ(D(t), ej(t)).
Second, making use of the fact that the probability to win the R&D lottery is strictly less
that one, one can easily see that the number of firms innovating each period is a random
variable ϕt, with ϕ   (1, K). It follows that the aggregate price index can be written as:
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where, as we said,  ej(t) is a stochastic variable as well.
Finally, from the arguments above it follows that Q(t) can be expressed the non-
stationary sum of a composite stochastic process:
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